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Presently merger cases are becoming quite important and legal 
systems produce the needed juridical backbone of the evolution 
of the market regulation. They are also important for the 
progress of the economic theory in the competition analysis and 
policies. This article will give a view of the decisions made by 
the European Commission, as well as, the US Department of 
Justice in the merger case of two telecommunication corporations 
such as WorldCom and MCI. It has one of the most important 
cases that determined the future development of the 
telecommunication and Internet industry worldwide.  
The paper is divided into two major parts: (I) analytical part that 
takes most of the analysis and (II) theoretical part. The first part 
is comprised of the analysis of the US Department of Justice 
and especially FCC that has the authority for such cases. The 
profound opinion and conclusions of the European Commission 
of one questionable segment of the telecommunications market, 
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is the Internet market that creates anticompetitive effects. The 
second part will give the predominant theoretical concepts used 
by the antitrust authorities. 
Introduction 
Nowadays high profile merger cases are becoming quite important and are taken 
as milestones of legal systems that produce the needed juridical backbone of the 
evolution of the market regulation. Additionally such cases are equally 
important for the progress of the economic theory in the domain of competition 
analysis and policies. 
This study will give outlook of the decisions made by the European 
Commission, as well as, the US Department of Justice in the merger case of two 
telecommunication corporations-WorldCom and MCI. This case was one of the 
most important cases that determined the future development of the 
telecommunication and Internet industry worldwide. The main point of the case 
analysis is to consider the competitive effects produced by such possible merger 
and the possible solutions in case of anticompetitive outcomes. 
The methodology used while writing the essay is based on two major parts:  
(I) analytical part that takes most of the analyses and (II) theoretical part. The first 
part is comprised of the analyses of the US Department of Justice and especially 
Federal Communications Commission that has the authority for such cases, as well 
as, the profound opinion and conclusions of the European Commission (DG 
Competition) of one questionable segment of the telecommunications 
market, the Internet market, that creates anticompetitive effects. The second part will 
give the predominant theoretical concepts used by the antitrust authorities. 
I. Analytical Part 
1. Federal Communications Commission / DoJ – United States of 
America 
The merger case between WorldCom and MCI was analyzed by Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC 98-225) and US Department of Justice (DoJ). 
They prepared document that contains the reasons and the possibilities for and 
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against such merger. The study is made in the light of United States market 
dimensions, but also significant part is dedicated to the international dimension of 
the merger. 
The basic feature of the applicant WorldCom on the US market is that it is one 
of the largest US telecommunications companies (1997 revenues of $7.35 
billion) and when added to that the vast international dimension of the company, 
the result is world prominent position of the company. On the other hand, MCI is 
the second largest US provider of long distance and international 
telecommunications services and also has high place on the domestic market. 
Markets 
Domestic Long Distance Services 
In order to be examined the competitive effects of the merger on the product market 
of domestic long distance services, they have to be defined. According to this 
study there are two product markets that need to be considered while 
concluding. The first one is residential customers and small business (mass 
market), that is comprised of telephone and similar communication services 
offered to the end users. The second market in question is medium-sized and large 
business customers (larger business market), that offers services for other companies 
in the American economy.1 The geographic markets are local and national. 
The Commission determined more than 600 companies (1996) as market 
participants on the relevant market for domestic long distance services. But those 
that make the most of the market are seen through the classification of mass 
market or larger business market. In the light of the mass market the dominant 
market participants are AT & T with market share below 50% of the total market, 
fallowed by MCI, Sprint, LEC, GTE and Southern New England 
Telecommunications Corp. (SNET). The larger business market consists of mainly 
the same names AT & T, MCI, and Sprint which hold the predominant part of the 
market and WorldCom that has, as described, substantial part.2 
The analysis of competitive effects was conducted on the grounds of many 
instruments. They gave results confirm that there will be an increase in market 
concentration (HHI Index), but they also showed decent, acceptable numbers in 
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terms of competition. In addition of the study, the industry market trends seen 
through the transmission capacity of the new networks, showed barriers to entry, 
but because of the future impact of the new technology on transmission capacity, the 
conclusions confirm future healthy competition. Furthermore, there is possibility of 
WorldCom to lose its characteristic of 'maverick supplier' on the wholesale 
market. As final conclusion it was estimated "that the merger likely will not impair 
competition in the domestic, interstate, inter-exchange market. We therefore 
decline to impose any of the various conditions proposed by commenters."3 
US International Services 
The US international services' product market is determined by the transport 
capacities as its main characteristic. The transport makes available the international 
physical transmission, voice telephony and data traffic that flow through the 
optical cables. For that reason it is estimated that augmentation of international 
transport capacity as input of international telecommunications services will 
moderate "the increase in concentration and prevent any anticompetitive 
effects."4 In addition, there are three regions as geographic markets: Atlantic, 
Pacific, and Caribbean/Latin America, which have to be taken in consideration. 
The market participants are distributed across the geographic regions. The 
most important is the Atlantic region, where the leading company in respect of 
telecommunication transports (submarine cables), is Global Crossing wit a market 
share about 40 percent fallowed by WorldCom (17.2%). As far as the MCI is 
concerned, the estimations indicate around 6.1 %, which brings the merger to 
significant market position on the Atlantic's route. The Pacific region is the 
second most important region where the market is lead by AT & T's 12.1 %. As 
a comparison the merger companies on this route will have around 9.6 % 
together, which is rather moderate taken that the market is highly competitive. 
The last region that has been questioned is Caribbean/Latin American Region on 
which MCI/WorldCom combined will become second provider of services with 
around 12.1%, right behind Telecommunications Corp. (Batelco) that has 24.2%.5 
At the end, there are final conclusions about the competitive effects of this 
merger on the market of US International Services. On the mass market as well 
as on the larger business market it was estimated that MCI/WorldCom 'is not 
likely' to have significant anticompetitive effect.6 
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Local Exchange and Exchange Access Services 
The relevant product market for local exchange and exchange access services was 
split into mass market and larger business market. As far as the geographic 
market is being analyzed it is vital to stress that "the Commission found that each 
point-to-point market constituted a separate geographic market "7 defining the 
market as local, national and regional depending on the point-to-point description. 
Additionally, the market participants (AT & T, MCI, and Sprint) on the mass 
market, which is clearly competitive market, control irrelevant parts of the 
market. On the larger business market the situation is quite similar and the main 
competitors are WorldCom (never exceeding 6 %, MCI) which is relatively small 
share and other national and local providers. 
In terms of analysis of competitive effects the findings show that on the mass 
market as well as on the larger business market "the merger of WorldCom and 
MCI ... is unlikely to result in unilateral or coordinated anticompetitive effects."8 
Internet Backbone Services 
The main element that was obstacle for competition and was extensively analyzed 
by the European Commission is the market for Internet Backbone Services. The 
product market is comprised of three key elements: end users, Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), and Internet Backbone Providers (IBPs). The geographical 
distribution of the providers, in the study of the American Federal Communications 
Commission, is national and worldwide. 
MCI as market participant has the lead place on this market, and is has both IBP 
and ISP, which means dominant position on the top-level Internet network and its 
functioning. Indeed, it is fallowed by WorldCom that has significant role on the 
domestic market owning three IBPs and majority part of a forth one. What is 
more it also controls a number of Network Access Points (NAPs) where IBPs 
interconnect (MAE-East (Washington DC), MAE-West (San Jose), MAE-Dallas, MAE-
Los Angeles, and MAE-Chicago.)9 
Without a doubt, the most important consequence of this merger might be 
creation anticompetitive effects on the internet market, or more precisely the 
Internet backbone services which are considered to be the chief and predominant 
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determinant of the quality and availability of Internet in general. Furthermore, 
such merger will eventually produce over time increased concentration of assets. 
Even more, the discussed settlements-free peering from IBPs, will surely be in 
future important barrier to entry. As a result of such findings MCI proposed a 
divesture. 
2. DG Competition - The European Commission 
1. Markets 
According to the European Commission on November the 9th 1997 two big 
American firms in the service industry, WorldCom and MCI, signed an 
agreement for merging into one company "MCI/WorldCom", which will be 
managed by WorldCom.10 WorldCom and MCI are telecommunications 
companies with main domain of operation – services, functioning on national 
and international level. The base of the firms is in the United States; however it has 
subsidies in many of the counties in the European Union.11 
The important thing for the European Union, and for the unit in charge of 
mergers and competition policy DG Competition (European Commission), is to 
estimate the "community dimension" of the merger, meaning the impact of the 
fusion of these companies on the competition in the internal market, and to 
react appropriately according to the Merger Regulation in order to keep the 
markets in equilibrium. The estimated impact, according to the Merger Regulation, 
is determined as allocation of turnover on a geographical basis. The methodology 
used for determination of the future aspects of the contract, showed that 
WorldCom and MCI each have Community-wide turnover exceeding ECU 250 
million. WorldCom and MCI do not have more than two-thirds of their 
Community-wide turnover in one, same Member State.12 After verifying that DG 
Competition has authority over the case "within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a) of the 
Merger Regulation",13 coordination and exchange of information has been established 
with the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (DoJ).14 
There are two main features of the compatibility with the common market: the 
carrier services and the internet-related services. DG Competition's testing is 
focused on the Internet as a main sphere of the study. The suppliers of the 
Internet services are called Internet Service Providers (ISPs) "offering Internet 
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access services on a commercial basis".15 In order, the ISPs, to provide Internet 
on a wide level they have to interfere between each other and exchange 
information by interconnection, which can involve either peering or transit 
services. The structure of the Internet is very important for this case because, as 
seen later, it will bring the key arguments for the divesture proposed and realized by 
MCI. So, there are two core levels of the Internet structure: the top-level networks 
and secondary peering ISPs. The definition of the top-level networks focuses the 
importance on the transit services' functioning, which indicates limitation to the 
internet exchanging process: "Traffic which is progressively defaulted to higher level 
networks will finally end up in the hands of an ISP who has no one else to whom 
to turn, and must either assume responsibility on its own account for delivering the 
traffic across peering interfaces, or return it undelivered. These networks are referred 
to hereon as "top-level networks" or "top level ISPs".16 
Market Definition 
The product markets that have to be seen are as fallows: host to point of presence 
access services, internet access services, top level or universal Internet 
connectivity. The point of presence services and their hosting (maintenance) are 
considered to have differentiated competition depending on levels of connection 
that varies form ISP level to low level. In addition, for the second category analyzed 
as a product market, the internet access services, the parties argued that these 
services can be easily substituted with other forms of data transmission service, but it 
does not appear to be such. The specificity of the Internet network is contained in 
the possibility to be reached by others, also connected on Internet, and the accent is 
given to the access to connection (barrier to entry), and thus exchange data and 
information. At the end, when explaining the third product market question rose is: 
weather "ISPs all compete against one another to provide the same connectivity 
services, or whether there are any distinct and narrower markets within the 
sector?"17 As a consequence, the responsible for the case at DG Competition while 
analyzing the relevant product markets came up with a final conclusion which 
states that "the relevant market on which the merging parties are active is the 
market for the provision of top level or 'universal' Internet connectivity". 
However, there has been an 'evolution of the market definition' that pushes 
the study in another direction. "The concept of 'top level network' might not 
represent today's economic reality, insofar as some of the players apparently 
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capable of functioning as top-level networks are in fact paying for some or all of 
their peering. Others may benefit from the peering agreements when no longer 
will be possible to enter/paid, and therefore their status as top-level networks 
may be open to question. As a result, the numbers of firms actually 
capable of offering competitive constraints may be smaller than the concept of 
'top-level networks' might imply.18 On the other hand, the rapid development of 
fiber optics and cable technology projects a way to the future for the smaller 
Internet providers to offer top level and universal Internet. But, here it must be said 
that today that is not the case, so that would mean that the process is in early 
stages and the market definition applied to this merger case is not to be changed, 
"but the fact that this is likely to happen should be borne in mind as a relevant 
factor when considering the market power of the parties.19 
In response, the parties argued that in case of price increase imposed by 
hypothetical monopolist, any ISP is capable to divert the internet traffic through 
consequent peering agreements enlarging the reach of its operation. In 
addition, they claimed that the ISPs 'in trouble' could tie contracts with other ISPs, 
and also that all of the operations will not reflect into unprofitable price increase 
by buying traffic.20 
Relevant Geographic Markets 
Assessing the relevant geographic markets DG Competition came up with three 
domains. The first market, corporate and traveler services is defined on national 
as well as at any other wider level, where as, the second, carrier services is at least 
regional, but also has international dimension. For the third one, Internet 
services, the geographic market depends of the level looked upon. So, it can be 
qualified as local, national, regional or worldwide.21 
Competitive Assessment 
DG Competition focused on three relevant points while assessing the competitive 
effects of the merger. The points in question are: carrier services, Internet access 
services and top level or universal internet connectivity. The market for carrier 
services on European level (according to the parties) is controlled about 95% by 
European telephone operators. WorldCom has been trying to set networks in 
every big city, and MCI has no significant influence. On transatlantic level the 
company MCI/WorldCom would have around 23% of the US market.22 As far as the 
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Internet access services are concerned, the study shows that there is substantial 
competition at retail level and low barriers to entry. Furthermore, the most 
important market that needs to be seen deeper is top level or universal Internet 
connectivity. During the competitive assessment of top level or universal Internet 
connectivity were used a couple of techniques and methods in order to prove the 
dominant and unacceptable position of the company to be made after the 
merger. The data showed that in terms of the number of connections MCI 
/WorldCom would have around 55% to 68%. In addition, the estimations about 
possible revenue pointed out 45-55% of the market earnings to go to the newly 
formed company. The traffic flow was also analyzed with two methodologies. 
According to the methodology of a hypothetical monopoly MCI/WorldCom would 
have 75-85% of the traffic flow. However the second methodology based on 12 
networks gave rather moderate data, placing the MCI/WorldCom's share around 
42-52% of the total traffic flow.23 
The Chief Operating Officer of WorldCom stated that" having a big network is 
a huge barrier to entry for competitors".24 Therefore, the conclusions are that "the 
combined network would be significantly larger than the size of its nearest 
competitor (Sprint), on either revenue or traffic flow, bearing in mind that the next 
competitor, the GTE group, is about half the size of Sprint."25 
Impact of Merger on Competition 
The impact of the merger on the competition in the domain of Internet is seen as 
anticompetitive. The authorities claimed that the amalgamation of leading 
Internet networks of WorldCom and MCI will produce a network that will have 
magnitude of behaving independently and thus will influence customers worldwide 
and in Europe. Reinforcement of the market position of the merged company 
(MCI/WorldCom) can be done by perusing different aggressive strategies and 
control the market imposing different peering agreements. Moreover, the company 
could influence the costs and the quality of the Internet services and also could 
be controlled the quality of the connector's service (peering partner). The growth 
of MCI/WorldCom will bring possibility for this company to reduce the 
independence of incumbent competitors and behave independently of its 
customers. As a response the parties claimed that multi-homing can be used as an 
alternative. To that the Commission responded with the fact that there is 
competitive limitation. The possibility of potential competitors was considered and 
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the conclusion is that the barriers to entry can be augmented easily for the 
competitors that want to enter at top-level network. As a result 'the merger might 
well create a 'snowball effect' in that MCI WorldCom would be better placed than 
any of its competitors to capture future growth through new customers".26 Having 
this in mind, the customers might try to act against MCI/WorldCom and contradict, 
but unless their actions are united there will not be any pressure nor effect on 
making the situation more competitive.27 
3. MCI's Divestiture 
MCI proposed divesture that had to reduce or even eliminate the suspicions 
about the "competitive" crater of the merger. Thus this meant that MCI by 
merging with WorldCom will lose the Internet business and will have to transfer 
number of contract to the newly formed company (NewCo – DG Competition or 
C & W – DoJ) that had to be inevitably sold to a 'purchaser'28 Furthermore, 
"NewCo will be an independent business with 100% of the Internet traffic and 100% 
of the Internet revenues of the iMCI Business.”29 
During the transaction MCI had to transfer to C & W assets and employees 
(22 nodes ; over 15,000 interconnection ports; and all the routers, switches, and 
other equipment dedicated to the backbone... ), ISP customers (1,300 domestic 
and international ISP customers), as well as, retail customers (Internet service,  
web-hosting, managed firewall, and Real Broadcast Network services).30 
After assessment of the undertakings promised by MCI, there was approval of 
the merger by DG Competition (European Commission), as well as, by US 
Department of Justice by authorization of the Federal Communications 
Commission. Afterwards final exchange of letters and decisions were executed. 
After the fulfilled divesture the merger has been "declared compatible with 
the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement"31 and that the 
merger will "will serve the public interest, interest, convenience, and necessity".32 
II. Theoretical Part 
1. The approach of the European Commission 
The European Commission bases its approach on the Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 (amended by Regulation (EC) No 1310/97) of 21 December 
198933 and decides to give a pass to the merger after fulfillment the needed 
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divesture by MCI. In order to be identified the scope of the merger, it is used the 
definition of concentration within the scope of Article 3 of the same regulation 
which states that "a concentration shall be deemed to arise where: (a) two or 
more previously independent undertakings merge."34 Consecutively to the finding 
that there is in fact a merger the Commission uses the Article 6(1)(c) to determine 
that the concentration "falls within the scope of this Regulation and raises serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, it shall decide to initiate 
proceedings."35 
The theoretical bases of the methodology of the European Commission were 
changed with the reform in 2004, when the test was changed into substantive 
'carbon test'.36 Until then the Commission, while solving the merger cases, was 
relying on "the concept of dominance: a merger must be blocked if it creates a 
dominant position, and therefore would likely result in higher prices, less choice 
and innovation."37 This test was used in the case of the merger MCI/WorldCom. 
The economic analyses to explain the case uses the so-called 'tacit collision effects 
or cooperative effects', meaning that "the merging parties will be able to raise 
price even without the cooperation of rival firms. This corresponds broadly to the 
legal concept of single-firm dominance."38 This way of deciding was also known as 
theory of 'concentrations with conglomerate nature'. 
2. The Approach of the US Federal Communications 
Commission/DOJ 
The regulation about dominant position and abuse of a dominant position in the 
United States is regulated with two acts : Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 2 
of the Clayton Act (1914) and added to that Robinson-Patman Act (1936)  
(Europe – Art. 82 (ex. Art. 86) of the Amsterdam Treaty, meaning abuse of 
monopoly power).39 When determining the thresholds of dominance the antitrust 
policy in the United States the antitrust authorities are guided by the definition 
stating that monopoly is "power to exclude competitors".40 The author agrees that 
the definition used by US is in fact close to the one used by the European 
authorities. However, when determining the dominance on the market the 
analyses must go beyond just the market shares and have to be seen other factors 
that might contribute to the possibility of raising prices by the concentration in 
question, whereas in Europe high market share is still considered to be enough for 
accusing of having dominance. 
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The Federal Communications Commission in the case of MCI/WorldCom, while 
determining the market power uses the "antitrust laws, including the DOJ and Federal 
Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the April 8, 1997.41 
Indeed, the analytical framework for assessing competitive effects is relying on 
the "1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines suggest that market shares should be 
assigned to each firm currently participating in the market and then the pre-merger 
and post-merger levels of concentration should be calculated, using the Herfindahl – 
Hirschman Index (HHI)."42 
However, here must be stressed that future projections of the development of the 
market must be taken in sight, because the picture which today's market shares 
create about the competitive position of the concentration is not clearly to be kept in 
future – the company's competitive importance might be understated or overstated. 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the US authorities based their findings on a bit more different 
grounds then their European equivalents. Their approach examines predominantly 
the effects on the national market, with an attitude of reluctance towards the 
international dimension, although they recognize that what happens on the 
international market directly influences the positions of their companies on the 
regional and the domestic market. The main difference would be the methodology 
used, which on one hand is more econometric based, but on the other hand, the 
US authorities give much more weight on the future earnings and expectations of the 
development of the industry and different segmented markets within the analyzed 
industry. At the end they come up with more or less the same conclusion as the 
European Commission about the anticompetitive effects of the merger, so together 
they coordinated the implementation of the divesture proposed by MCI. 
When one studies the used methodology and technique of the European 
Commission, one notices that the European authorities are little bit more vigilant. 
The possible reasons for acting that way might be many, but manly: the tests, the 
economic and econometric analyses, unfinished or ever evolving institutional 
framework, etc. However, the most important is the approach used by DG 
Competition and that is the concept of dominance. The authorities are primarily 
concerned about the possible dominant position seen from 'today's perspective', 
while determining the bottom line of the future developments as not quite secure. 
They recognize the importance of the future market solutions (in this case the rapid 
development of technology and most notably fiber optic cables), but they seem to 
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be more bias to solutions like 'snowball effect'. That is probably why there was 
serious need to be enforced a reform of the competition policy and merger 
regulation, that took place later on. 
In conclusion it must be said that, both authorities did justify the merger and 
came up with more or less the same conclusions. Even though the used slightly 
different approaches, they both were first and foremost concerned about their own 
interests and areas of influence, so the merger was resolved with a favorable 
outcome for all major sides involved. 
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